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ABSTRACT
Spinoza’s philosophy and Buddhism have often been 
compared based upon their tendencies towards seeing the 
world as a single order and moving beyond our passions 
and desires. But the comparison of these philosophies 
also creates interesting problems. One problem is the 
way we relate to this order itself. In Spinoza we achieve 
enlightenment when we recognize that we are a part of a 
single substance which has its own order and necessity. 
This leads us to transcend the bondage of our passions 
through reason. And when we reach the highest level of the 
intellectual love of God, we show kindness on all beings 
still trapped in this bondage. Buddhist enlightenment is the 
recognition of the dependent origination of all things. It is 
a larger order of causality which we are a part. We suffer 
within this order through our attachments so our goal is to 
eliminate our attachments. When we see the world in this 
way, we do not judge through the categories of good and 
evil and we show compassion to all living creatures still 
in the state of ignorance. So there are obvious similarities. 
But a major difference in these two approaches is differing 
ways they regard the order itself. Spinoza focuses on the 
love of this order – intellectual love of God – which leads 
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him affirm non-judgment and kindness. And Buddhism 
focuses on the non-attachment to this order which leads 
to compassion. Comparing and contrasting these two 
philosophies is valuable because it allows a deeper 
understanding of the Buddhist role of compassion as a 
special kind of (non-passive) passion which breaks the 
suffering of others. It also clarifies elements of Spinoza’s 
philosophy which are not easily understood, for instance, 
his claim that pity as a useless emotion. 
Keywords: Spinoza, Buddhism, Dependent Origination, 
Compassion, Pity
Substance and God
Spinoza’s idea of a single substance is the heart of his philosophy. 
This is in contrast to Descartes’ philosophy which posits two substances: 
thought and extension. This single substance is also the equated with God 
or nature. God according Spinoza is a substance which exists by itself 
and is the cause of itself. Spinoza describes the notion of substance that 
“By Substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through 
itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another 
thing, from which it must be formed”.1 
Thought and extension are merely attributes of this single 
substance. In a way this is reminiscent of the tradition of divine names in 
philosophical theology. Spinoza writes that  substance consists of infinite 
attributes, “each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.”2 
And that it “necessarily exists.”3  That is why, Spinoza can claim in the 
famous proposition 15, ethics 1 that “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing 
can either be or be conceived without God”.4
This also means that God is a necessary order. For instance Spinoza 
writes that “God is the immanent and the transient cause of all things”.5 
“God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one”.6 
“In Nature there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined from 
the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain manner.”7 
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And finally: “Things could have been produced by God in no other manner 
and in no other order than that in which they have been produced.”8 
Dependent origination
This order is also present in Buddhism. The teaching of dependent 
origination is one of the fundamental teachings of the Buddha.  It is known 
as paticcasamupada in the Pali canon or the teaching of cause and effect. 
In its general understanding, it is used in the context of kamma and rebirth. 
According to Sahdra, this principle is even compatible with empirical 
psychology which holds that “any given psychological phenomenon exists 
in the context of a complex nexus of causes and conditions. For empirical 
psychologists, tightly controlled experiments can help to identify some 
of the causes of a psychological phenomenon, although they do so by 
controlling or ignoring many other possible influences.”9
Spinoza is aware of this psychological dimension when he writes 
of the idea of freewill as a kind of ignorance. He writes that we believe 
we have freewill because we are ignorant of the causes which lead us 
to do what we do and think what we think, while at the same time we 
are conscious of doing and thinking. We are a part of a causality but in 
our ignorance we believe in our own agency. As long as we follow our 
desires and passions we are moved by this nexus of causation. We are in 
bondage and we experience suffering because we desire things outside 
of our control. 
Just as Spinoza believes in God as a necessary order, dependent 
origination is itself an order. It is a kind of law. The teaching of the niyamas 
or natural laws are a fundamental doctrine in Buddhism. They are divided 
into five types such as caloric order (utu-niyāma), germinal order (bīja-
niyāma), psychical order (citta-niyāma), moral order (kamma-niyāma), 
and finally the order of natural phenomena (dhamma-niyāma).10
Utuniyāma: physical inorganic order; physical law; the 
natural law dealing with the events in the natural world or 
physical environment. Bījaniyāma: physical organic order; 
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biological law; the natural law dealing with animals and 
plants, in particular, heredity. Cittaniyāma: psychic law; 
the natural law dealing with the workings of the mind and 
thinking. Kammaniyāma: order of deed and result; the law 
of kamma; moral law; the natural law dealing with human 
behaviour, specifically intention and the actions resulting 
from it. Dhammaniyāma; order of the norm; the general law 
of cause and effect; causality and conditionality; the natural 
law dealing with the relationship and interdependence of 
all things, phenomena.11
Some Buddhist approaches consider that when one achieves 
enlightenment, the world as dependent origination shows itself as illusion. 
But the idea of dhamma-nyama suggests that the world exists by itself as 
a natural order. Yet this also depends upon the individual ignorance. The 
more we develop a concentrated mind, the more we can stop our ignorance 
and stop the chain of causes. The more we merely possess imagination, 
the more the imagined world leads us to be bound within this causality. It 
is interesting that Spinoza has a similarly negative view of imagination. 
Overcoming
In a work which considers Spinoza from an Eastern perspective, 
van Reijen defines Spinoza’s concept of eternity in term of God’s essence. 
He focuses upon seeing one’s bodily existence from the perspective of 
eternity. He writes that “Spinoza’s idea that the essence of the special 
private body is to understand from the perspective of eternity and that 
only then other things can be understood and God can be seen as the 
cause”.12 This would be the goal for the human being which is akin to 
Buddhist enlightenment which involves seeing oneself within the order 
of dependent origination. 
But as long as we are attached to our finite bodies and our belief 
in freewill we remain ignorant and see the world in a distorted way 
based upon its utility for us. According Spinoza, this ignorance is a 
form of human bondage since being influenced by our passions makes 
us passive in face of the causes external to us. Sometimes, Spinoza also 
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describes it as confused knowledge. The French philosopher Deleuze 
observes concerning confused knowledge that it “expresses the natural 
condition of our experience in so far as we do not have adequate ideas. 
It is constituted by the linking together of inadequate ideas and of the 
affects-passions that result from them.”13 This confused knowledge does 
not understand the body as it is a part of the larger order of the existence 
of things or substance. 
In order to move beyond this bondage, more abstract reason should 
be the foundation of knowledge. As in geometry, adequate knowledge 
represents the order of things beyond the limits of mere bodily sense 
perception. He explains in the ethics that “The idea or knowledge of the 
mind follows God and is related to God in the same way as the idea or 
knowledge of the body”.14
Spinoza’s uses the idea of reason’s power to control the passions 
as a kind of liberation. In the Ethics he states that “I shall treat the power 
of reason, showing how much reason itself can control the emotions, and 
then what is freedom of mind or blessedness”.15 Passion in seen in relation 
to its passivity in the face external objects. This leads to suffering. But 
the use of reason allows us to cease to be passively affected by external 
objects. In this way, he writes, “In proportion, then, as we know an emotion 
better is it more within our control, and the less does the mind suffer from 
it.”16 Reason is able to control and cease suffering.
Buddhism believes that many passions or desires are caused 
by ignorance which leads to an unwholesome mind and unwholesome 
actions.17 Actions can be distinguish as good and bad actions. According 
to the principle of dependent origination they are called sankhara. The 
condition of sankhara produces consciousness.
Human Freedom as God’s Freedom
The concept of freedom in Spinoza is often misunderstood. In 
Book 2, proposition 7, he writes that “The order and connection of ideas 
is the same as the order and connection of things.18 This passage further 
explains that “the relation between the mind and the body is the same 
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as that between an idea and its object, since the mind is nothing but that 
idea of the body which exists in the infinite intellect of God”.19 This 
means that to the extent that I can achieve adequate knowledge, my mind 
can expand beyond the limits of my body and its restricted desires. My 
knowledge can embrace the order of God. I can become this order and 
share in its eternal power and freedom. So human freedom is actually 
the ability to use reason to move beyond the limitations of the body to 
enjoy God’s freedom. 
But in the context of the human body, Ioan writes that we can 
understand freedom as “diminishing the determinations from outside 
and enhancing determination from within.”20 This again is based upon 
reason. According to Kashap, “when one is conscious of one’s freedom 
to choose whether or not to do a certain thing, one will not do anything 
other than what follows from adequate ideas in one’s mind.”21 
This whole idea can be seen in Book 1, definition 7 where Spinoza 
writes: 
That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of 
its own nature alone and is determined to action by itself 
alone. That thing, on the other hand, is called necessary 
or rather compelled which by another is determined to 
existence and action in a fixed and prescribed manner. 
Spinoza states the relation of metaphysical notion of “free” and 
psychological notion of “free” that “God is free from the passions, nor is 
He affected with any emotion of joy or sorrow”.23 This statement is very 
similar to Buddhist teaching nivana which is known as enlightenment. The 
word nivana is interesting. The prefix Ni means a negation, and the root 
vana refers to the passions. The idea of enlightenment then is ni-vana, or 
the overcoming of the passions. In this sense the experience of freedom 
by the individual is following the principle of God’s freedom as being 
determined from within and not being influenced by what is external. 
This is similar to the Buddhist idea of non-attachment. 
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The Intellectual Love of God versus Non-attachment 
We saw that the lowest form of knowledge is called confused ideas 
which is related to human bondage. The second level is called adequate 
ideas and is related to human freedom. The third and highest stage is 
called intuitive ideas. It is related to what Spinoza calls the intellectual 
love of God. In proposition 25, Spinoza writes: “The highest effort of the 
mind and it’s the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of 
knowledge”24 In Book 4 preposition 28 Spinoza claims that “Knowledge 
of God is the mind’s greatest good; its greatest virtue to know God”.25 
Knowledge of God refers to the eternal and infinite essence of God. 
Spinoza States the idea of love of God as follows:
The intellectual love of the mind toward God is the very 
love with which He loves Himself, not in so far as He is 
infinite, but in so far as He can be manifested through the 
essence of the human mind, considered under the form 
of eternity; that is to say, the intellectual love of the mind 
toward God is part of the infinite love with which God 
loves Himself.26
Kisner claims that “the means for achieving this ‘intellectual 
love of God’ is a gradual process of individual and sometimes collective 
self-improvement, which is guided by an ideal.”27 Intuitive knowledge is 
considered that “The highest effort of the mind and it’s the highest virtue 
is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge”.28 In other words, 
it is to see things from an eternal perspective, or from the perspective of 
the whole. 
But how can we compare this with Buddhism. When the Buddhist 
reaches enlightenment, when they see this order of dependent origination, 
they are to detach themselves from its causality in order to avoid suffering. 
But Spinoza wants us to identify with and love this order? The answer 
seems to lie in the way Buddhism and Spinoza regard compassion. The 
two approaches are not as dissimilar as they first appear.
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Passion and Compassion
As we discussed earlier Spinoza distinguishes between active and 
passive. In book 3, proposition 3, he writes. “The actions of the mind 
arise from adequate ideas alone, but the passive states depend upon those 
alone which are inadequate”. 29 Then, Spinoza offers evidence on the 
passion which is confused idea when he writes: “The force and increase 
of any passion and its perseverance in existence are not limited by the 
power by which we endeavor to persevere in existence, but by the power 
of an external cause compared with our own power”.30 This is the way 
inadequate knowledge or the passive passions are connected to human 
bondage. Buddhism relates this passivity to suffering.
Spinoza’s doctrines in Ethics Book 4, which focus on of human 
bondage or of the strength of emotions are related human ignorance. 
Spinoza tries to show that pity, good and evil, joy and sorrow are based 
in ignorance. He describes pity as useless emotion and writes: “Pity, in 
a man who lives according to the guidance of reason, is evil of itself and 
useless”. 31 This idea of pity as useless is not very understood. But if we 
compare it to Buddhist ideas of compassion it makes more sense.
Compassion has been taught and practiced for millennia in three 
main Buddhist traditions: Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana. For many 
Western researchers, these approaches to the alleviation of suffering are 
more akin to psychology and philosophy than religion insofar as they do 
not require belief in a higher power to reap their benefits. Makransky and 
Germer observe that “as clinical scientists and psychotherapists begin to 
systematically explore the concept of compassion, it may be helpful to 
consider the nuances in understanding that have emerged within these 
traditions in different parts of the world.”32 This makes the comparison 
of Spinoza’s ideas of overcoming the passions and the Buddhist idea of 
compassion particularly important.
The Buddhist concept of compassion is found in four sublime 
attitudes which are the heart of teaching of the Buddha. They are metta, 
karuna, mudita and upekkha.  Sarkar clarifies these terms as follows:
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Metta is the Pali word and in Sanskrit it is Maitri (love or 
loving-kindness). It is the first one of the Brahma-Viharas 
or the sublime states. The term “Karuna‟ is found in 
Buddhist texts like Visuddhimagga, Shilakkhandhavagga 
etc. If anybody is perceived to have suffered and other one 
shakes or moves with compassion at once, then it is called 
karuna or or compassion or pity. It is the second Brahma-
Vihara. Mudita is the third one of the Brahma-Viharas 
which is translated as sympathetic joy or sympathy or 
gladness. When someone feels happy seeing other person’s 
happiness, then it is called mudita or sympathetic joy. When 
a person remains mentally in a neutral position between 
the two extremes of sorrow and happiness then it called 
upekkha which is translated as equanimity.33
Spinoza’s understanding of the passions is rooted in the distinction 
between passivity and activity. Buddhism also sees this idea as mental 
state in the context of attachment (kilesa) upon which our actions happen. 
Both of schools see this issue as the order of causality. Passions are related 
to our desire in relation to our ignorance. In its original meanings the 
passions represent a passivity. We are manipulated by things outside of 
our control and hence we are in a state of bondage. The original meaning 
of passions is also related to suffering. 
Returning to pity, we see now that it would be the identification 
with a particular suffering. Spinoza’s philosophy instead is an affirmation 
of joy, the intellectual love of God, or power. This reflects the Buddhist 
distinction between passion and compassion. Com-passion is not a 
mere passion as an attachment. Compassion does not attach to the 
individual who is suffering, it is instead a generalized break [karuna] of 
suffering in general. It is unselfish according to the meaning of mudita. 
Compassion is not passive, it is active and directed toward the order of 
dependent origination itself. While Spinoza and Buddhism differ on their 
interpretation of order, love and the status of suffering, they end up in a 
similar destination. That is a freedom beyond individual freedom, a love 
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beyond attachment, a generalized compassion and kindness that breaks 
the suffering of others.
Spinoza’s ideas and Buddhist ideas show many similarities. But 
the purpose of comparing them means little in itself. What is gained from 
this comparison is a deeper understanding of principles which are little 
understood in each tradition. For instance, Buddhists often focus upon 
non-attachment to the extent that they fail to appreciate their connection to 
the world through compassion. It is a passion which is not merely passive 
but actively breaks the chain of suffering. Spinoza can remind Buddhism 
of its own principles concerning the joy of being actively engaged in the 
world and the importance of metta as a kind of love that affirms the whole. 
Likewise, Buddhism can clarify Spinoza philosophy to show that the 
rejection of such passions as pity is not the rejection of compassion and 
kindness. It is instead a recognition that to break the suffering of others 
requires something beyond the passivity of pity. 
While we cannot bring Spinoza’s philosophy into accord with 
Buddhism, we can play them off of one another to gain deeper insights 
into their respective doctrines and insights.
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